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Abstract
Background: Cholera epidemics continue to challenge disease control, particularly in fragile and conflict-affected
states. Rapid detection and response to small cholera clusters is key for efficient control before an epidemic
propagates. To understand the capacity for early response in fragile states, we investigated delays in outbreak
detection, investigation, response, and laboratory confirmation, and we estimated epidemic sizes. We assessed
predictors of delays, and annual changes in response time.
Methods: We compiled a list of cholera outbreaks in fragile and conflict-affected states from 2008 to 2019. We
searched for peer-reviewed articles and epidemiological reports. We evaluated delays from the dates of symptom
onset of the primary case, and the earliest dates of outbreak detection, investigation, response, and confirmation.
Information on how the outbreak was alerted was summarized. A branching process model was used to estimate
epidemic size at each delay. Regression models were used to investigate the association between predictors and
delays to response.
Results: Seventy-six outbreaks from 34 countries were included. Median delays spanned 1–2 weeks: from symptom
onset of the primary case to presentation at the health facility (5 days, IQR 5–5), detection (5 days, IQR 5–6),
investigation (7 days, IQR 5.8–13.3), response (10 days, IQR 7–18), and confirmation (11 days, IQR 7–16). In the model
simulation, the median delay to response (10 days) with 3 seed cases led to a median epidemic size of 12 cases
(upper range, 47) and 8% of outbreaks ≥ 20 cases (increasing to 32% with a 30-day delay to response). Increased
outbreak size at detection (10 seed cases) and a 10-day median delay to response resulted in an epidemic size of
34 cases (upper range 67 cases) and < 1% of outbreaks < 20 cases. We estimated an annual global decrease in
delay to response of 5.2% (95% CI 0.5–9.6, p = 0.03). Outbreaks signaled by immediate alerts were associated with a
reduction in delay to response of 39.3% (95% CI 5.7–61.0, p = 0.03).
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Conclusions: From 2008 to 2019, median delays from symptom onset of the primary case to case presentation and
to response were 5 days and 10 days, respectively. Our model simulations suggest that depending on the outbreak
size (3 versus 10 seed cases), in 8 to 99% of scenarios, a 10-day delay to response would result in large clusters that
would be difficult to contain. Improving the delay to response involves rethinking the integration at local levels of
event-based detection, rapid diagnostic testing for cluster validation, and integrated alert, investigation, and
response.
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Background
Cholera transmission was reported in 34 countries in
2018 and 55 countries in 2019 [1, 2]. The disease is esti-
mated to be substantially under-recorded [3]. Large
cholera epidemics frequently coincide with armed con-
flict and humanitarian crises, including those in Demo-
cratic Republic of the Congo, Iraq, Somalia, South
Sudan, and Yemen [4–8]. At the start of a cholera out-
break, transmission is driven by the low capacity to de-
tect and isolate the first identified cases. Inadequate
preparedness and poor access to case management
drives increased mortality. The rapid detection and con-
trol of small outbreaks is therefore key for efficient con-
trol before an epidemic propagates [9].
In 2017, the Global Task Force on Cholera Control
(GTFCC) recommended that countries increase their
capacity to contain small outbreaks, using rapid response
teams, to aid efforts to substantially reduce global trans-
mission by 2030 [10]. However, little is known about the
global capacity for rapid detection of, and response to,
cholera outbreaks. In a review of the detection of all-
pathogen outbreaks in Africa reported in the World
Health Organization’s (WHO) Disease Outbreak News
from 1996 to 2014, the median time from onset of
symptoms of the first identified case (or health facility
visit, if unavailable) to discovery of the outbreak (de-
fined, for example, as the declaration of the outbreak or
appearance in an official report) was 27 days [95% CI
20–31.5] [11]. A review of all-pathogen outbreaks in fra-
gile and conflict-affected states from 2000 to 2010 found
a similar median delay of 29 days [range 7–80] from
symptom onset of the first identified case to detection of
the outbreak and a median delay of 7 days [range, 0–30]
from detection to investigation [12]. For cholera, a
month-long delay in detection represents approximately
6 median serial intervals and, thus, a high potential for
uncontrolled transmission [13].
To understand the potential for early detection and
rapid response for cholera outbreaks in fragile and
conflict-affected states, we examined temporal trends in
cholera epidemics to evaluate with what delays the first
case or cluster presented, was detected, investigated,
responded to, and was confirmed by laboratory culture.
We modeled epidemic sizes corresponding to these de-
lays. To explain these delays, we investigated the mecha-
nisms for early warning of these outbreaks, predictors of
delays, and global improvements in reducing delays.
Methods
Compilation of cholera outbreaks
The period of 2008 to 2019 was chosen to reflect recent
experience with cholera response. A list of countries that
appeared ≥ 2 times during this period on the World
Bank’s Harmonized List of Fragile Situations, and had a
documented cholera burden as per the GTFCC’s 2017
list of cholera-affected countries, was compiled (Add-
itional file 1) [10, 14]. Small-island states affected mainly
by climate change rather than conflict were excluded. A
list of countries meeting the fragility criteria but not in-
cluded in the GTFCC list were included if they were
documented using other sources as having had cholera
outbreaks from 2008 to 2019 (i.e., Iraq, Myanmar, and
Syria). Cholera-affected countries that did not meet the
fragility criteria but either (a) hosted refugees (i.e.,
Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda) and/or (b) border fragile
and conflict-affected states with cholera outbreaks (i.e.,
Benin, Ethiopia, Niger, Nigeria, Tanzania, and Zambia)
were included. Given that no annual list of annual chol-
era outbreaks exists, a list of outbreaks was compiled
using a two-step process. We first reviewed the WHO’s
annual cholera reports to identify which countries re-
ported transmission during the study period [15]. Coun-
tries that do not routinely report cholera to WHO but
are known from other sources to have had cholera out-
breaks were included (e.g., Ethiopia and Myanmar). We
then sought details on the occurrence of sub-national
outbreaks from the WHO’s Disease Outbreak News and
UNICEF’s Cholera Outbreaks in Central and West Af-
rica Bulletin (2015–9) [16, 17]. The GTFCC definition of
a cholera outbreak was applied (cholera-free region: ≥ 1
culture-confirmed case and evidence of local transmis-
sion, or year-round transmission: unexpected increase in
magnitude or timing of suspect cases over 2 weeks with
laboratory confirmation) [18]. As stool sampling and
transport is often unfeasible in insecure settings, we in-
cluded instances where cholera alerts were identified
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(e.g., one case of acute watery diarrhea (AWD) testing
positive for cholera by rapid diagnostic test (RDT)) [19].
Finally, we included cholera alerts that triggered the
cholera investigation mechanism, but where testing de-
tected another pathogen, in order to explore detection
and investigation mechanisms.
Compilation of reports on cholera outbreaks
We searched the peer-reviewed literature for further
identification and reporting on cholera outbreaks. Peer-
reviewed articles were sourced from PubMed/MEDLINE
using a date-specific keyword search (“country AND
cholera”). Given that only a small number of outbreaks
are reported in the scientific literature, we searched the
gray literature, including epidemiological summaries, na-
tional cholera preparedness and response plans, and
non-peer-reviewed studies. The sources included the fol-
lowing: (1) Reliefweb (https://reliefweb.int/, a repository
of documents and data from humanitarian crises) using
a date-specific keyword search (“country AND cholera”;
“UNHCR AND cholera”) and (2) regional outbreak bul-
letins and journals including the WHO EMRO Weekly
Epidemiological Monitor (2008 to 2019), WHO AFRO
Outbreaks and Emergencies Bulletin (2017–9), WHO
SEARO Journal of Public Health, WHO WPRO Western
Pacific Surveillance and Response Journal, and UNICEF
Cholera Outbreaks in Central and West Africa Bulletin
(2015 to 2019) [16, 20–23]. The Program for Monitoring
Emerging Diseases (ProMED) database of disease obser-
vations from media sources was used to fill in missing
information on dates, but was not used as the primary
source of information [24]. When little information was
available from the sources above, websites of ministries
of health and crisis-specific surveillance systems (e.g.,
early warning alert and response systems or networks
(EWARS/EWARN) or disease early warning systems
(DEWS)) were searched. An example includes the
EWARN of the Syrian Assistance Coordination Unit for
Northern Syria [25].
Inclusion criteria and data extraction
Outbreaks were included if at least two of the following
dates were available: (1) dates of symptom onset of the
primary case, and/or case presentation, and/or outbreak
detection, and (2) dates of investigation and/or response.
If the date of symptom onset for the primary case was
missing, it was estimated as 5 days before the date of
case presentation (equal to the median delay for out-
breaks with available date of symptom onset), or date of
outbreak detection if date of case presentation was un-
available. If the date of case presentation was unavail-
able, it was replaced by the date of outbreak detection.
The earliest dates of (1) symptom onset for the first
identified primary case, (2) case presentation to a health
facility, (3) detection of outbreak/alert raised, (4) investi-
gation by local health authorities, (5) response, and (6)
laboratory confirmation by culture were extracted
(Table 1). We defined the date of response as the earliest
date by which a cholera-specific control measure was ap-
plied to the outbreak-affected area (e.g., water, sanita-
tion, and hygiene (WASH) activities, setup of case
management, active case-finding, community-based ac-
tivities, and delivery of cholera kits). The starting month
and year of the outbreak, geographical context (i.e.,
urban, rural, or displacement camp), type of crisis or fra-
gility (i.e., armed conflict, fragile state, natural disaster,
refugee setting, non-fragile state bordering a fragile
state), and the WHO region were extracted. Any add-
itional information on factors that may have contributed
to the observed delay, including presence of an early
warning function, was extracted. Details on the signal
type for outbreak detection were recorded, if available,
as a (1) formal alert detected by health workers reported
immediately within the surveillance system, (2) informal
alert from community members or a non-governmental
organization (NGO) reported immediately, or (3) weekly
data analysis of surveillance trends.
Analysis of delays and their predictors
For each outbreak, median delays and their interquartile
ranges (IQR) were calculated by subtracting the date of
symptom onset of the primary case from the dates of (1)
case presentation, (2) outbreak detection, (3) investigation,
(4) earliest response, and (5) laboratory confirmation. For
each outbreak, the dates were graphed on a timeline.
To investigate the association between the observed
delay from symptom onset of the primary case to response
and potential predictor variables, a multivariate ordinary
least-squares regression model was used. Delay to re-
sponse was log-transformed to produce a normalized dis-
tribution. Extreme values in delay to response were judged
to represent meaningful delays rather than data errors and
were retained in the dataset. Predictor variables included
signal type, context, crisis, WHO region, and year of out-
break onset (to detect any secular trend). Akaike informa-
tion criterion (AIC) and a step-wise selection process was
used to assess model fit and complexity. In separate re-
gressions, year of outbreak onset was used as a predictor
variable to investigate secular trends for delays to case
presentation, outbreak detection, investigation, and con-
firmation. Loess curves were used to visualize the tem-
poral trends using a smoothed trend line that down-
weighted extreme values [26]. Percent change and 95%
confidence intervals were presented for each regression.
Branching process model
A preliminary review of retrieved reports demonstrated
that the early epidemic sizes at the dates that the
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outbreak was detected and responded to were rarely
documented. Instead, to estimate the potential early epi-
demic sizes at each delay, a branching process model
was used to estimate the median and range of epidemic
sizes at the time points indicated by the median delays
to case presentation, investigation, response, and con-
firmation [27–29]. We simulated multiple outbreaks
using 10,000 runs and calculated the proportion of these
outbreaks with early epidemic sizes below the threshold
of 20 cases in a 5 to 30 day period. We selected this
threshold arbitrarily as the outbreak size with potential
to be contained. Transmission started with a seed case(s)
which generated secondary cases from a negative bino-
mial distribution Z ~NegB(RE, k) with a mean equivalent
to the reproduction number (RE, 2.5 [13, 30], reflecting
early and high transmission potential among an unvac-
cinated population) and heterogeneity introduced by a
dispersion parameter (k, 4.5, reflecting low overdisper-
sion in RE) [31]. Each new infection drew a time of infec-
tion from a serial interval distribution S ~
gamma(shape = 0.5, rate = 0.1) with a median of 5 days
[4, 13, 32]. We assumed that at the time of outbreak de-
tection there were 3 seed cases and that all resulting in-
fectious persons were symptomatic. Simulations would
end by chance when either the cases did not produce
additional secondary cases, or they reached 1000 cases
(representing a large outbreak). In a sensitivity analysis,
we considered outbreaks of larger size at detection (i.e.,
10 and 20 seed cases).




Seventy-six outbreaks from 34 countries met the inclu-
sion criteria. Overall, 1970 documents were reviewed,
and 138 documents were retained (1–4 documents per
outbreak including 28 peer-reviewed articles and 110
gray literature sources as listed in Additional file 2) [34–
171]. Where countries reported acute watery or severe
diarrhea as a proxy for cholera (e.g., Ethiopia, Myanmar)
[172, 173] or where surveillance was poor due to conflict
in remote areas (Myanmar, Northern Nigeria, and Syria
as documented by Sparrow and colleagues) [19], few or
no reports were located. Few reports from endemic
countries with ongoing transmission (e.g., Cameroon,
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Somalia) were found,
likely due to the difficulty in ascertaining start dates.
Three false alerts resulting in the exclusion of cholera
were identified in Cameroon (2) and Syria (1); we de-
scribed these outbreaks qualitatively and left them out of
the quantitative analysis [100, 101, 108]. One alert of an
RDT-positive case where culture could not be obtained
due to ongoing conflict was identified in Syria and kept
in the quantitative analysis (noting that confirmation
was not possible) [83, 84]. Fifty-one (67%) of the 76 out-
breaks were missing the date of onset of symptoms for
the primary case.
Narrative descriptions and sources of information for
outbreaks are compiled in Additional file 2. Most reports
were from Africa (80.3%, mainly Chad, South Sudan,
Burundi, and Uganda) and the Eastern Mediterranean
region (13.2%, mainly Yemen, Iraq, and Syria) (Table 2).
Outbreaks occurred during armed conflicts (e.g.,
Afghanistan, South Sudan, Yemen), after natural disas-
ters (e.g., cyclones in Mozambique, post-earthquake in
Nepal), in fragile situations (e.g., Angola, Chad), in refu-
gee settlements (e.g., camps in Kenya and Tanzania),
and in countries bordering cholera-affected fragile states
(e.g., Benin, Tanzania). Most reports (56.6%) were from
urban sites. Where the information was available (55/76
outbreaks), most (83.6%) were detected through formal
and informal alerts compared with weekly data analysis
(16.4%).
Delays and potential epidemic sizes
Median delays are listed in Table 3, and histograms of
the delays are listed in Additional file 3. The timelines of
the individual outbreaks are visualized in Fig. 1. The me-
dian delay from date of the first identified case’s symp-
tom onset to case presentation at the health facility was
5 days (IQR 5–5). The median delays between symptom
onset of the primary case and detection (5 days, IQR 5–
6), investigation (7 days, IQR 5.8–13.3), and response
Table 1 Dates used to estimate delays in detection, investigation, and response for cholera outbreaks
Date Defined as earliest date (by priority)
Date of start of outbreak 1. Symptom onset for first identified case
2. Case presentation to health facility (less 1 day)
Date of alert/outbreak
detection
Alert issued from health facility, community health worker, community member, local public health office, or laboratory
Date of investigation Investigation by local authorities
Date of earliest response Any cholera-specific response activity (case-finding, control measures by health facility or public health office, house-
hold/community WASH, case management)
Date of laboratory
confirmation
First documented culture confirmation
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(10 days, IQR 7–18) spanned 1 to 2 weeks. Across coun-
tries, these delays varied; investigations and responses
were routinely launched on the same or next day in
Cameroon and Nepal, while long delays of 70 days in
Uganda in 2015, 79 days in Chad in 2010, and 84 days in
Yemen in 2011 were reported. The median delay to la-
boratory confirmation, for the 41/76 outbreaks for which
the information was available, was 11 days (IQR 7–16),
similar to the delay to response. Countries affected by
conflict frequently had delays from symptom onset of
the primary case to response greater or equal to 2 weeks
(Fig. 1).
Several outbreaks were detected when already-large,
challenging containment (e.g., Afghanistan, 2011, 255
cases, ID 2; Chad, 2017, 50 cases and 13 deaths, ID 19;
Ethiopia, 2015, 268 cases, ID 28; Haiti, 2010, > 1000
cases, ID 32). Table 4 summarizes the model-simulated
early epidemic sizes that the outbreaks could have
reached by the date of different delays and different ini-
tial outbreak sizes. With 3 seed cases at detection, a me-
dian delay to case presentation of 5 days resulted in a
median epidemic size of 9 cases (upper range, 29 cases),
with nearly all outbreaks < 20 cases (98.6%). A median
delay to response of 10 days resulted in a median epi-
demic size of 12 cases (upper range, 47 cases), with a
comparable proportion of outbreaks < 20 cases (92.6%).
Lengthening the delay to response to 30 days resulted in
an upper range of 72 cases, with 67.7% of outbreaks
remaining < 20 cases. Using 10 seed cases to simulate
outbreaks of larger size at detection, a median delay to
case presentation of 5 days resulted in a median epi-
demic size of 28 cases (upper range, 55 cases), with a mi-
nority of outbreaks < 20 cases (5.7%). With a median
delay to response of 10 days delay, there was a median
epidemic size of 34 cases (upper range, 67 cases), with <
Table 2 Characteristics of outbreaks, 2008–2019
Characteristic N (%)
WHO region
Africa (AFRO) 61 (80.3)
Eastern Mediterranean (EMRO) 10 (13.2)
South-East Asia (SEARO) 3 (4.0)
Americas (PAHO) 1 (1.3)




Refugee or displacement camp 6 (7.9)
Crisis
Fragile situation 31 (40.8)
Armed conflict 25 (32.9)
Country bordering FCAS 10 (13.2)
Natural disaster 5 (6.6)
Refugee setting 5 (6.6)
Surveillance system N = 47 (not reported for 29 outbreaks)
Early warning function 36/47 (76.6)
Through routine surveillance 22/36 (61.1)
EWARS/DEWS 14/36 (38.9)
Routine surveillance 11/47 (23.4)
Signal N = 55 (not reported for 21 outbreaks)
Alert 46/55 (83.6)
Formal alert 37/46 (80.4)
Informal alert 9/46 (19.6)
Weekly data analysis 9/55 (16.4)
Table 3 Median delays (with interquartile range (IQR) and range)
Delay Median delay (days) (IQR) Range (days)
Delay to case presentation (n = 76)
Symptom onset to case presentation 5 (5–5) 0–22
Delay to detection (n = 76)
Symptom onset to outbreak detection 5 (5–6) 0–29
Case presentation to outbreak detection 0 (0–0.3) 0–24
Delay to investigation (n = 48)
Symptom onset to investigation 7 (5.8–13.3) 0–84
Case presentation to investigation 2 (1–8) 0–62
Delay to response (n = 67)
Symptom onset to response 10 (7–18) 0–84
Case presentation to response 6 (2.5–13.5) 0–74
Delay to confirmation (n = 41)
Symptom onset to confirmation 11 (7–16) 0–74
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1% of outbreaks < 20 cases. At 30 days, the upper range
was 100 cases, with < 1% of outbreaks remaining < 20
cases. With 20 seed cases at detection, outbreaks en-
larged quickly, reaching a median of 55 cases (range 30–
89) with a median delay to response of 5 days and me-
dian of 65 cases (range 40–110) with a median delay to
response of 10 days.
Factors associated with delays
Given that the signal type was complete for only 55/76
observations, two models were implemented: a multivar-
iable adjusted model (including year of outbreak onset,
WHO region, context, and crisis type), and a bivariate
model for signal type only (informal/formal alert versus
weekly data analysis). Using AIC for the multivariable
Fig. 1 Delay in weeks from date of onset of symptoms to outbreak detection (blue circle), response (black circle), and confirmation (red circle), by
outbreak, 2008–2019 (excluding outbreaks missing response date)
Ratnayake et al. BMC Medicine          (2020) 18:397 Page 6 of 16
model, including only year of outbreak onset returned
the lowest AIC score (Additional file 4). A weak crude
association between year of outbreak onset and delay to
response, with an annual decrease in response time of
5.2% (95% CI 0.5–9.6, p = 0.03), was found (visualized in
Fig. 2). This model met the assumptions for linearity
and homogeneous variance and explained 6% of the vari-
ance. Similar decreases in delay to detection, investiga-
tion, and confirmation were found (Fig. 2 and
Additional file 5). In the second model, alerts (versus
data analysis) were associated with a reduction in re-
sponse time of 39.3% (95% CI 5.7–61.0, p = 0.03) (box-
plot displayed in Fig. 3). The model met the
assumptions for ordinary least-squares regression but
one extreme value in delay affected the leverage. The
model explained 8% of the variance.
More information from the examination of outbreaks
is illustrative of the use of alerts. Of the 83.6% of out-
breaks detected through alerts, 37/46 (80.4%) were
through alerts by a health worker or community health
worker and 9/46 (19.6%) through informal alerts by
community members. For example, in 2015, in Aleppo,
Syria, an alert was issued through the EWARN via
phone after RDT testing of a suspect, and an investiga-
tion initiated based on the positive result (2-day delay to
investigation, ID 63). In 2017, in a displacement camp in
Northern Nigeria, an alert of a suspect case was issued
by MSF by phone through the EWARS on the same day
of case presentation (2-day delay to investigation, ID 48),
demonstrating the rapid recognition of a suspect case by
health workers [171]. Comparisons of outbreaks within
countries are instructive. In Benin, of two outbreaks in
rural areas detected in 2016, one outbreak was detected
through an immediate call to public health authorities
(5-day delay to detection, ID 7) while for the other
outbreak, issuance of the alert on the weekly set day of
routine surveillance data transmission resulted in a 13-
day delay to detection (ID 8). In Central African Repub-
lic in 2011, an alert from the community of multiple sus-
pect cases was issued late (13-day delay, ID 16)
compared with 2016, when an alert from Red Cross vol-
unteers was issued in half the time (5-day delay, ID 17).
In several instances, early warning systems further
benefited from rapid investigation and response. For ex-
ample, in Afghanistan, in 2010, the DEWS provided a re-
sponse mechanism to link the detection of a large
cluster of 60 suspect cases in a remote and insecure vil-
lage by a local NGO with rapid action which reportedly
led to containment within a month (6-day delay to in-
vestigation, ID 1). In 2011, the DEWS in Afghanistan de-
tected an already-large outbreak of 255 suspect cases in
multiple clusters but with a rapidly administered re-
sponse (21-day delay to investigation, ID 2). Reduced
transmission within 3 months followed. In Liberia in
2017, a suspect case that died en route to the health fa-
cility was detected based on symptoms, triggering a
rapid response to isolate additional cases in the index
case’s village (7-day delay to investigation, ID 38). In
Chad in 2017, two suspect cases among children which
resulted in rapid progression to death were reported to
the local health facility, who investigated the source vil-
lage and found a larger cluster of 50 cases and 13 deaths
(6-day delay to investigation, ID 19). Though already a
large outbreak, this led to a response on the following
day.
Information in reports suggested improvements in sur-
veillance, investigation, and response over time. In
Cameroon in 2016, two false alerts for cholera later at-
tributed to food poisoning and rotavirus were made by
health workers and community members respectively
Table 4 Simulated epidemic sizes (with standard deviation (SD) and range), and proportion of outbreaks < 20 cases for outbreaks of
3, 10, and 20 seed cases at detection
3 seed cases 10 seed cases 20 seed cases


















5 9 (3.7, 3–29) 98.6 28 (5.7, 12–55) 5.7 55 (7.4, 30–89)
Investigation 7 10 (4.4, 3–40) 96.9 31 (6.1, 11–61) 1.6 60 (8.2, 34–99)
Response 10 12 (5.1, 3–47) 92.6 34 (7.0, 16–67) < 1 65 (8.8, 40–110)
Confirmation 11 12 (5.4, 3–50) 91.9 35 (7.1, 13–69) 67 (9.1, 41–105)
















14-day delay 14 14 (6.0, 3–51) 85.8 37 (7.8, 17–79) < 1 70 (9.7, 41–113)
21-day delay 21 16 (7.4, 3–63) 76.6 40 (9.0, 16–87) 74 (10.8, 43–124)
30-day delay 30 18 (8.9, 3–72) 67.7 43 (10.3, 18–100) 78 (12.2, 43–131)
Legend: DRC Democratic Republic of the Congo, CAR Central African Republic, PNG Papua New Guinea
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and led to rapid investigation upon detection, testing by
RDT and culture, and ongoing control activities during
the investigation period (ID 13, 14). In Somalia, faster
response in insecure urban areas using EWARS in 2016
and 2018 can be compared to a lack of a comprehensive
early response during ongoing transmission over 2
months in 2008 (14- and 19-day delays versus 2-month
delay, ID 54–56). Nepal’s EWARS facilitated rapid detec-
tion and response to clusters from 2011 onwards (total
delays 6–9 days, ID 42–44) [75, 130, 162]. In 2016, RDT
capacity was added at health facilities to enable better
discrimination between alerts of cholera or diarrhea due
to other pathogens [161].
Potential factors related to long delays to response
Long delays from symptom onset of the primary case to
response (~ 2 weeks) were observed in 29/67 (43.2%)
outbreaks for which a response date was available. These
appeared to be related to poor sensitivity of the formal
surveillance system due to the remote locations of out-
breaks [63] (Papua New Guinea, ID 52); insecurity posed
by armed conflict (Somalia, 2008, ID 54; South Sudan,
2008, ID 57; Yemen, 2011, ID 72); reliance on laboratory
confirmation to declare an outbreak before initiating a
comprehensive response (Iraq, 2008, 2015, ID 33, 34,
South Sudan, 2014, ID 58); assuring government declar-
ation and mobilization of non-governmental actors
(CAR, 2011, ID 16); a less effective local response which
required reinforcement by capacity from the national
level or other partners (Congo, 2018, ID 25; Ethiopia,
2015, ID 28; Guinea-Bissau, 2008, ID 31; South Sudan,
2017, ID 61; Uganda, 2015, ID 68; Zimbabwe, 2018, ID
79) [113]; and missed superspreading events (e.g., a fu-
neral in Zimbabwe, 2018, ID 79) [136].
Discussion
In an era of large-scale cholera epidemics in conflict set-
tings like Yemen and previously cholera-free settings like
Haiti, improving and sustaining early detection and re-
sponse to small outbreaks remains critical for averting
large-scale epidemics. Reducing delays in the timelines
of patients presenting to health facilities, increasing
Fig. 2 Scatterplot of cholera outbreaks by delay between date of symptom onset of the primary case and dates of a presentation, b detection, c
investigation, d response, and e confirmation, and Loess curves, as a function of outbreak start date, 2008 to 2019. Red dots represent individual
outbreaks over time and gray shading indicates 95% CI of Loess regression
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capacity of health workers to recognize suspect cases of
cholera, and reinforcing local investigation and response
therefore remain as important as vaccination and other
emerging tools. Some of the largest outbreaks in recent
years in South Sudan (2014–6), Ethiopia (2015 onwards),
and Zambia (2017–8) have suffered from late detection
and/or response, which has led to surges of cases that
have overwhelmed health systems [131, 140, 174–176].
Our findings indicate that from 2008 to 2019, median
delays from symptom onset of the primary case to case
presentation at the health facility and to response were
approximately 5 days and 10 days, respectively. Longer
delays to response were documented across the whole
time period. Evaluations from Nigeria, Yemen, and other
settings have shown that reasons for delays to detection
include poor population access to health services due to
disrupted health systems and/or insecurity, difficulty in
discerning diarrhea and dehydration due to cholera from
other causes without rapid diagnostics, reliance on la-
boratory confirmation before initiating response, and
less effective local response [171, 177, 178]. Epidemic
control more than 2 weeks post-onset carries a strong
risk of epidemic propagation, particularly where the
population is highly mobile. Our simple model simula-
tions and sensitivity analyses suggest that with 3 seed
cases, in 2 to 33% of scenarios such delays could result
in clusters of 20 or more cases that would be difficult to
contain. Comparatively, a field investigation and prelim-
inary response to contain transmission done at the time
of case presentation (~ 1 week) could potentially reduce
the probability of reaching these epidemic sizes to 2 to
4% of scenarios. If larger outbreaks of 10 seed cases are
detected, even within ~ 1 week, 95% of outbreaks could
accumulate 20 or more cases, and thus would be difficult
to contain.
Early detection and response are major aims of the
Ending Cholera roadmap. There are two reasons to be-
lieve that policy and practice have somewhat narrowed
the gap between detection and response. First, we found
a global improvement in time to response that corrobo-
rates a previous analysis of improvements for detection
of all-pathogen outbreaks in low- and middle-income
countries from 1996 to 2014 [11]. This may be related to
more attention and investment by governments and the
GTFCC to the impacts of cholera epidemics in fragile
states, given a decade of large and devastating cholera
outbreaks in Haiti and across West and Central Africa,
the Horn of Africa, and the Gulf of Aden [10]. Some
countries appear to have documented improved capacity
for detection and response, as shown in this analysis
(e.g., Chad, Nepal, Somalia). This may be reflected by in-
vestments into strategies like the Joint External Evalu-
ation process which have specified critical gaps for
improvement [179–181].
Detailed case studies of cholera outbreaks provide
practical observations on the mechanisms of surveil-
lance, diagnosis, and response which can reduce delays.
Early detection with high-quality epidemiological data
has been augmented with the use of sentinel site surveil-
lance at hospitals equipped with RDTs and trained and
vigilant health workers in Kathmandu, Nepal [162];
community-based surveillance using existing community
Fig. 3 Delay from onset of symptoms of the primary case to response, by signal type (immediately-notified alert compared with weekly data
analysis), 2008–2019 (N = 49/76 outbreaks with information on signal type available). Gray dots represent individual outbreaks
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health worker or Red Cross volunteer networks to en-
able early warning of clusters in the community before
patients appear at health facilities in Central African Re-
public and Haiti [71, 152, 182, 183]; and other event-
based surveillance mechanisms, including phone hotlines
and mobile phone fleets, to enable immediate notifica-
tion of suspect events in public, private, and NGO
clinics and in the community, as seen in Northern
Nigeria and Cameroon [171, 184, 185]. Response should
not be delayed by poor laboratory capacity. A potentially
stronger role for health workers in local facilities exists
in their use of enriched, high-specificity RDTs [186] and
aligned probable case definitions to validate clusters of
suspected cholera cases that can trigger an immediate
investigation and response [162, 171]. This is directly ap-
plicable in remote districts and insecure areas where la-
boratory confirmation will be slow. Timely field
investigation and preliminary response remains promis-
ing as most outbreak reports cited the use of an early
warning alert system, with several examples of integrated
investigation and response capacity. We consider that an
integrated alert and at least a preliminary response to an
outbreak within 1 week of onset should be possible in
fragile settings [187]. However, despite the presence of
EWARS in nearly 80% of the outbreaks examined, the
median delay to response was 10 days. Where EWARS
was used successfully to link early detection with a pre-
liminary and robust response, for example in
Afghanistan (2010–1), Nepal (2011–6), and Northern
Nigeria (2018), a timely response was judged to be
dependent on adequate and trained human resources
(e.g., district-level rapid response teams or local health
facility staff capable of multidisciplinary investigation
and a generic response [63, 162]), and the ability to
mount at least a preliminary response moving forward
independent of laboratory confirmation [52, 75, 100,
101, 139, 161, 171]. For example, investigation and re-
sponse were integrated in Afghanistan (2010) where a
local NGO was trained rapidly to carry out a compre-
hensive community response, as they had more access to
the area than health authorities in an insecure area [52].
In Chad (2017), investigation was carried out by the staff
of a local health facility, who also initiated the prelimin-
ary community response [137].
It is important to consider the limitations inherent to
a retrospective review of data from secondary sources.
First, as no global registry of cholera outbreaks exists,
we relied on the manual compilation of available situ-
ation reports and articles. The most comprehensive
source, the WHO’s current compilation of annual chol-
era data, does not provide detailed information on out-
breaks and misses non-reporting countries. The small
annual numbers of outbreaks pre-2015 documented
here may reflect the few global data sources available. As
well, larger outbreaks are more likely to be detected,
responded to, and therefore documented and included
here. Second, the delays are estimates of reality; dates
from situation reports are likely inaccurate to an un-
quantifiable degree as the exact dates of local investiga-
tion and response may be subjective and
are documented infrequently. The identification of the
primary case(s) depends on the depth of the field investi-
gation, and with a multi-pathway pathogen like Vibrio
cholerae that causes a range of disease severity, transmis-
sion chains may be missed. Fifty-one (67%) of the 76
outbreaks were missing the date of onset of symptoms
for the primary case, which then had to be estimated,
limiting accuracy. The dates of response were based on
the judgment of the timing of the first transmission-
reducing intervention and thus may represent variable in-
tensity of response across outbreaks. Of note, the longest
delays to response noted during outbreaks in Chad,
Ethiopia, Somalia, and Uganda were related to the first vi-
able response after an inadequate local response. To ad-
dress these inconsistences, we sourced multiple reports
per outbreak to triangulate the information and obtain a
clear timeline, and excluded a large number of outbreaks
where reports lacked detailed dates. Second, we note that
while outbreaks are likely to occur during conflict, they
are difficult to detect amidst violence where surveillance
coverage is poor [19]. These outbreaks, with potentially
high mortality, may have gone undetected, unless they oc-
curred in urban areas and/or propagated to a point of be-
ing overwhelming, as in South Sudan in 2014 and Yemen
in 2016 [4, 131]. Third, the simple branching process
models used here for demonstrating early epidemic
growth are for illustration purposes only. These models
did not take into account key sources of uncertainty in-
cluding initial susceptibility to infection (influenced by
prior cholera infection or vaccination), heterogeneity in
contact and transmission routes, depletion of susceptible
persons, and the time-varying Rt value.
The documentation of the occurrence and features of
cholera outbreaks is currently very heterogeneous. A real-
time global database using standard outbreak event re-
ports maintained by WHO regional offices to prospect-
ively log data and metrics from outbreaks of cholera, as
well as other epidemic-prone diseases, would yield super-
ior accuracy for the annual evaluation of timeliness. WHO
AFRO’s Weekly Bulletin on Outbreaks and Emergencies
provides an existing template which can feed into such a
global database [20]. WHO AFRO has used this tool to
provide annual metrics of timeliness in outbreak response
for epidemic-prone diseases from 2017 to 2019, demon-
strating reduced time from symptom onset of the primary
case to outbreak detection (defined as alerting national au-
thorities) from 14 (IQR 6–37) days in 2017 to 4 (IQR 1–
11) days in 2019 [188].
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Conclusions
Cholera epidemics will continue to appear unpredictably
and cause serious morbidity and mortality in countries
affected by armed conflict and fragility. Cholera surveil-
lance and response is dependent on rethinking the
timely detection, investigation, and response to primary
cases at the local level. This includes reinforcing out-
break detection through event-based surveillance, con-
sistent weekly reporting using standard case definitions,
systematic use of enriched RDTs, and integrating early
investigation with preliminary local response. These
measures should increasingly underpin the detection
and containment of emerging epidemics.
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